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Abstract: Most Western economists and policymakers agree that the Yuan is significantly 
undervalued  and  push  for  its quick  nominal  revaluation.  This  paper  defends  that  many 
domestic and foreign factors could be responsible for the Yuan’s undervaluation, and the 
People’s bank of China (PBC) cannot optimally invest growing foreign exchange reserves. It 
provides a theoretical framework to discuss the optimal strategy associating a gradual nominal 
revaluation of the Yuan with higher inflation, and structural and macroeconomic policies to 
bring the real exchange rate to its equilibrium level. This strategy allows absorbing external 
imbalances while laying down the foundation for China’s long-term growth.
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1. Introduction
Since its accession to the WTO in December 2001, China is rapidly increasing its trade 
surplus  and  foreign  exchange  reserves.  China’s strong  growth  despite  the current global 
financial  and  economic  crisis  and its large  trade  surplus  vis-à-vis  the  United  States,
experiencing sluggish economic recovery and high unemployment, have made passionate the 
US debate  about  the  political  pressure  to  put  on  China  to  force  it  to  quickly  revalue its
currency, i.e. the Yuan (Renminbi/RMB). The end of Chimerica seems inevitable (Ferguson 
and Schularick 2011).
The issue of the Yuan’s undervaluation is brought to the forefront because depreciating
the USD now seems to be the only policy option available to stimulate the U.S. economy. 
Other American macroeconomic policies are subjected to insurmountable constraints, i.e., the 
solvency constraint for the fiscal policy and the zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal 
interest rate for the monetary policy while the very loose U.S. monetary policy seems to 
accentuate the USD’s overvaluation.
China-bashing has become a popular U.S. media and political sport ever before the current 
crisis despite the consensus view among economists that a RMB appreciation is not likely to 
fix  the  trade  imbalance  with  China  (Tatom  2007). Many  Americans  believe that  China
manipulates its currency to unfairly create a trade advantage, contributing to large US trade 
deficits  and  hence  the  loss  of  US  businesses  and  jobs,  and  consider  the Yuan’s  nominal
revaluation  as  the  solution  to  reduce U.S.  trade  deficits (Frankel  and  Wei  2007).  Some 
economists, e.g., Krugman (2009), consider China’s Yuan policy as the origin of the subprime 
crisis and label China as “mercantilist”. This accusation is considered as very vituperative by 
McKinnon (2010) because the U.S. trade deficit is due to the low saving rate.
The large literature on China’s exchange rate policy mainly addresses four issues. The 2
first is the  Yuan’s  undervaluation. While  disagreeing  about  the  degree  and  origins  of 
undervaluation, most researchers agree that the Yuan is undervalued because China has a 
large and growing current account surplus.
1 Only a few economists contest that the Yuan is 
systematically undervalued (Chu 2005; Cheung et al. 2007, 2010; Wang et al. 2007; J. Chen 
2009) and their empirical findings indicate that exchange rate policy may have played an 
insignificant  role  in  China’s trade  surpluses. Wen  (2011) suggests  that the  RMB  may 
significantly depreciate once China abandons the  exchange  rate peg and  China’s massive 
precautionary savings are unleashed toward international financial markets in search for better 
returns.
The second issue is about the rhythm of revaluation. The status quo is defended by Liu 
(2004) and Mundell (2004) because currency appreciation would aggravate unemployment 
and  financial  fragility.  Tung  and  Baker (2004), arguing  that  it  boosts  Chinese  per  capita 
incomes and purchasing power in USD terms, discard such destabilizing effects of a one-step 
maxi revaluation, while Voon et al. (2006) advance that the negative impact of the RER 
appreciation on exports may be diluted by the positive impacts attributing to a reduction in the 
RER misalignment. Yi.Z. Wang (2010) suggests a gradual appreciation of the RMB against 
the USD between 6% and 10%. If a one-step maxi revaluation is not adopted, macroeconomic 
policies and regulations and economic reforms must be skillfully implemented to ensure the 
external and internal equilibrium (Liu 2004; Dai 2006; Woo 2006; Eichengreen and Hatase 
2007; Hong et al. 2008; N’Diaye 2010).
The  third issue  concerns  the  effect  of  capital  account  convertibility  on  exchange  rate 
regime and monetary policy. Capital account convertibility remains China’s long-term goal 
even though the literature on capital liberalization is confronted to an erosion of consensus on 
its benefits. Given the increasingly porous capital account, several proposals, from a one-step 
1 For an overview of the literature on the quantitative assessment of the Yuan’s undervaluation, see Das (2009). 
For recent studies, see Peng et al. (2008) and Yi.Z. Wang (2010).3
revaluation of the RMB, implementing a currency basket, widening the trading band to the 
adoption of managed but freer float in the medium to long term, are advanced to mitigate 
increasing external imbalances and the resulting distortions (Roberts and Tyers 2003; Tung 
and  Baker 2004; Goldstein 2004; Frankel 2005; Eichengreen  2005; Obstfeld  2007).
2
Approaches other  than  one-step  revaluation  allow  China  to postpone financial  account 
liberalization and the adoption of a flexible exchange rate, but with the risk of inviting more, 
not less, hot money inflows into China, thus exacerbating the very macro imbalances (Tung 
and Baker 2004). McKinnon and Schnabl (2009) are against floating the RMB, arguing that
the build-up of foreign currency claims is due to that China’s large saving (trade) surplus 
results in a currency mismatch because of its inability to lend in its own currency. However,
the substantial openness of China’s capital account implies ineffective sterilizations and a
trade-off between exchange rate stability and monetary independence (Laurenceson and Tang 
2007; Yo.Z. Wang 2010). To solve this trilemma smoothly, the PBC should continue to relax 
the exchange rate management, and to further deregulate capital outflows.
The RMB’s recent and future international role constitutes the fourth issue. Lardy and 
Douglass (2011) show that China does not yet meet any of the major preconditions necessary 
for convertibility needed for playing the role of international currency, i.e. a strong banking 
system,  relatively  developed  financial  markets,  and  an  equilibrium  exchange  rate. 
Nevertheless, the RMB already becomes a significant force impacting the exchange rates of 
the  Asian  currencies  (Chen  et  al. 2009).  Therefore,  China  can  speed  up  its  currency 
internationalization by following a regional approach while accelerating the reforms to make 
the RMB convertible, and to liberalize and open its financial system (Park 2010). During the
process, since income and monetary policies and capital account controls remain of crucial 
importance for  worldwide  macroeconomic  stability,  they  should  be  supported  by 
2 Yao (2008) and Liu and Fan (2010) show that a more flexible RMB exchange rate regime is optimal.4
internationally  coordinated  policies  and  cooperative  monetary  schemes  to  reduce  global 
imbalances  and  destabilizing  cross-currency  speculation  (Flassbeck  and  La  Marca  2009;
Schnabl  2011).  China’s  currency  reform  could  induce  a  reduction  of  its  USD-dominated 
assets, triggering a further depreciation of the USD. The potentially costly consequences call 
for new rules for the world financial architecture (Oksanen 2010).
This  paper  suggests that  multiple  foreign  and  domestic  factors  lead to  a  real 
undervaluation of the Yuan, and it is impossible for the PBC to optimally invest growing 
foreign exchange reserves. This justifies a new strategy to revalue the Yuan. The central 
objective of the paper is thus to contribute to the literature on the China’s exchange rate 
policy  by  providing  a  theoretical  framework justifying  a  combination  of  strategies,  i.e.
associating a gradual nominal revaluation of the Yuan with higher inflation and structural and 
macroeconomic  policies,  to  bring  the  real  exchange  rate  to  its  equilibrium  level.  It  also 
advocates some new policy measures to absorb China’s external imbalances while laying 
down the foundation for the China’s future growth.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section analyses the factors 
leading  to the  Yuan’s  undervaluation.  Section  3  argues for  its  revaluation.  Section  4 
theoretically justifies the combination of strategies for a real revaluation. Section 5 discusses 
policy measures helping achieve the latter. Section 6 concludes.
2. The factors leading to the Yuan’s undervaluation 
The appropriate measure for the Yuan’s undervaluation is the continuous, one-directional 
and  accelerating  accumulation  of  Chinese  foreign  exchange  reserves beginning  in  1994 
(Figure 1). The balance of payments is given by:5







! ! ! " " " " ! " ! " " !
"






t t t t t h
t
t t












i i F X i B
P
E P
i T Y H P B
P
E P




where  (...) Z and  (.) H represents exportations and importations respectively, 
h
t P and 
*
t P the 
price  of  home  and  foreign  goods respectively, t Y the  output, t T the  taxes, t i the  nominal 
interest rate,  t E the nominal exchange rate (direct quotation), t B trade barriers, t X foreign 
exchange reserves. (...) F is the capital flows including the foreign direct investment (FDI)
which positively reacts to the output (i.e. market size) and the ratio of foreign wage (
*
t W ) to 
domestic wage ( t W ). Foreign variables are marked with an asterisk.
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Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China, UNCTAD, and PBC.
According to (1), many foreign and domestic variables could directly or indirectly affect 
the accumulation of reserves. Low wages, the Yuan’s undervaluation and the FDI play an 
important role in the build-up of reserves since the middle 1990s, while China’s accession to 
the  WTO  and  the  loose  U.S.  monetary  policy  greatly  contribute  to  accelerate  this 6
accumulation  in  the  2000s.  Hereafter,  we  briefly  analyse  the  evolution  of  these  factors, 
notably the exchange rate policy, and their impact on the accumulation of reserves.
3
When  China  opened  its  door to  international  trade  and  FDI  in  the  early  1980s to 
modernize its economy, it was an insignificant player in international goods and financial 
markets. The average Chinese wage was only about 95.67 yuans (or USD 32.58) in 1985 per 
month against 2687 yuans in 2009 (USD 393.35).
4 Despite a very low labour cost, China 
often experienced trade deficits until 1993 because it did not supply goods needed by other 
countries. After higher inflation rates recorded during 1988-1989 and 1993-1994 triggered by 
the price liberalization and a loose monetary policy, the Yuan had to be devaluated by 33.16% 
against the USD in August 1994 despite its gradual devaluation since 1980, while official and 
swap rates were unified. Between August 1994 and July 2005, China adopted a monetary 
regime of exchange-rate targeting, which was named a managed float but was a de facto peg 
at around 8.28 Yuan/USD, as a nominal anchor against high inflation. It allowed successfully 
slow down Chinese inflation rate.
During the 1997 Asian crisis, many economists and international speculators considered
that  the  Yuan  was overvalued  and  predicted its  large  devaluation  because the  South-east 
Asian economies have sharply devalued their currencies. China maintained the Yuan’s peg to 
avoid competitive  devaluations, keeping its  neighbours from  an  even  more  catastrophic 
financial and economic downturn.
5
After its economic opening, China was facing a period of dollar shortage. This experience 
and financial turmoil experienced by some emerging countries due to dollar shortage have
convinced China to accumulate dollars at all costs (Corden 2009).
3 For a review of Chinese exchange rate policy, see Xu (2000), Lin and Schramm (2003), Huang and Wang 
(2004), Goldstein and Lardy (2009), and Sun (2010).
4 The exchange rate was 2.9366 and 6.8310 for 1985 and 2009 respectively. See Ceglowski and Golub (2011), 
and Banister and Cook (2011) for international comparison of labour costs in manufacturing. For statistics of 
wages, see the official site of the National Bureau of Statistics of China.
5 Instead, China sought to placate exporters by offering a 17% value-added export tax rebate.7
The  period  of  dollar  shortage  ended with  the  implementation  of  extremely  loose US 
monetary  policy, i.e. very  low  interest  rates during  prolonged  periods, to  stimulate  the 
economy after the burst of the Internet bubble in 2000. The easier access to cheap credit by 
American businesses and households has resulted into an exceptional growth in the global 
dollar supply. The supplementary dollars hold by foreign central banks returned to American
financial markets with the effects of plunging the median- and long-term interest rates, further 
stimulating credit activities. This policy induced a large bubble in property price which has
excessively stimulated the U.S. consumption through the virtual wealth effect. In 2005-2007,
annual U.S. trade deficits represented about 6% of U.S. GDP, indicating a large excess of 
money supply and a lack of savings.
Curiously, this extraordinary increase in the dollar supply did not translate into higher 
inflation in the USA or in the rest of the world, invalidating the prediction of monetarists. A
plausible explanation is that central banks of emerging economies, having previously suffered 
dollar shortage, were only too happy to conserve additional dollars as reserves and use them 
to buy U.S. Treasuries and assets. This has led some economists to devise a theory of global 
saving glut (Bernanke 2005), which obscures the very loose U.S. monetary policy. Taylor 
(2009) challenges this theory by showing that saving in the rest of the world has decreased 
over the period. 
The  massive  inflow of  liquidity to emerging  economies has  led  to  more productive 
investment, particularly in China, to meet additional needs of U.S. consumers. China has 
furthermore received an important boost to its exports by joining the WTO, prompting many 
more multinationals to invest in China.
The  FDI  in  China  began  to  increase  rapidly  from  1992  due  to  three  factors: a very 
favourable fiscal law voted in 1991, the reaffirmation of China’s determination to open the 
economy and  the Yuan’s  aggressive devaluation in 1994. Besides  the  flows of  capital  it 8
brought, the FDI has especially contributed to the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves 
through its stimulant effects on exportations by greatly increasing the labour productivity and 
the production of high quality goods desired by Western consumers (Whalley and Xin 2010; 
Ceglowski and Golub 2011). These effects have been largely amplified by the elimination of 
trade barriers after China’s accession to the WTO. The resulting massive increase in foreign 
exchange reserves after 2001 has revealed the hidden real undervaluation of the Yuan against 
major currencies.
In the mid-2000s, China was under intense pressures from the USA, Japan and the EU to 
revalue the  Yuan and  to  introduce a  more  flexible  exchange  rate  regime.  The  Yuan’s 
undervaluation against the USD was then estimated between 18 to 60% (Zhang and Pan 2004;
Coudert and Couharde 2007). A nominal revaluation of the Yuan by about 22% against the 
USD is undertaken from July 2005 to July 2008, while shifting from the dollar peg to a peg to 
a basket of currencies, with a fluctuation range of ±0.3% per day. The PBC has kept the Yuan
at about 6.83 per USD after July 2008, as part of stimulus measures to help China weather the 
global recession.
The Yuan’s revaluation was incomplete. Its undervaluation was reinforced over times by
the continuous depreciation of the real exchange rate induced by the capability of foreign and 
domestic firms in China to produce and export more goods of higher values at low costs.
Hence, the previous revaluation of the Yuan had not significant negative effects on the U.S. 
imports from China, contrary to the prediction by empirical studies (Thorbecke and Smith 
2010). There was therefore a one-way-bet in the foreign exchanges markets, which not only 
attracted  hot  money  inflows  but  inhibited  private  capital  outflows  from  counterbalancing 
China’s  huge  trade  surplus, leading  to  an  undue  build-up  of  official  exchange  reserves,
erosion of monetary control and hence the instability of the Yuan’s peg (Ma and Sun 2007),
and increasing the pressure for the Yuan to revalue (McKinnon and Schnabl 2009; Mckinnon 9
et al. 2010) and the need for a more flexible exchange rate regime (Liu and Zhang 2009). In 
this  context, the  Yuan  began  in  July  2010  to  revalue  against  the  USD  under  American 
pressures, bringing one dollar’s value down to below 6.35 yuans in October 2011.
3. Why China should revalue the Yuan?
Despite recent higher increases in wages relative to productivity growth, China’s unit 
labour costs remain extremely low compared to these in Western countries. In the long term, 
Chinese workers will likely be trained to perform as productively as Western ones. Hence, 
competitiveness will play in favour of China over a long period: as long as the cumulative 
adjustment of wages is smaller than the cumulative increase in productivity, and foreign and 
domestic firms improve the quality and the scope of goods produced to be exported, China
will  continue to  experience  a trade surplus with  the real exchange rate  depreciating over 
times. If  the  Yuan  is  not  or  insufficiently  revaluated,  given  the  nature  of  industrial  and 
macroeconomic  policies  pursued  by  China  and  its  Western  trading  partners,  China  will 
continuously increase its international reserves. Moreover, strong growth in China will attract 
not only the FDI but also hot money, further accentuating the problem.
The Yuan’s revaluation, pleasing Western policymakers, could also be in the China’s 
interest. It is necessary, inevitable and desirable just as much as it happened to be with the 
Deutschmark in 1969 and it would not damage Chinese development (Oberpriller et al. 2008).
Besides,  China  needs  it to  ensure domestic  financial  market  stability,  and  to  avoid  an
overheating of the economy and a soaring inflation. According to international experiences,
the Yuan’s real appreciation could have a powerful effect in boosting job creation in the 
service sector and hence would contribute to restructuring the Chinese economy towards a 
domestic demand-based growth track (Xu 2009). 10
The accumulation of foreign exchange reserves was originally intended to stabilize the 
nominal exchange rate. Beyond a certain level, its utility becomes negative because assets 
bought with these reserves earn a real rate of return less than the rate of real appreciation of 
domestic currency in the future, and allow buying back a quantity of goods smaller than that 
sold initially to accumulate them.
China’s actual reserves ($3197.49 billions in June 2011) have far exceeded the optimal 
level corresponding to its objective of exchange rate stabilisation. Four main policy options 
are available to China to correct this situation: spending and investing them, diversifying them 
through  appropriate  management  of  portfolios while  avoiding  unnecessary  risks, gradual 
liberalization of the capital account, and a switch in their holders (Zheng and Yi 2007). 
Given their importance and growth (if the Yuan is undervalued), it is unlikely that the 
PBC and sovereign fund managers can maintain or increase their value in terms of purchasing 
power because international investment opportunities are limited and risky.
First, many Western countries are likely to see their debt reaching a non-sustainable level 
because politicians favour the welfare of voters at the expense of future generations due to the 
quasi-absence of intergenerational altruism in the public sphere. They will eventually default 
or refinance public debt with money creation, as it is happening in the USA and the UK under 
quantitative easing policies.
Second, Anglo-Saxon hedge funds and speculators are much quicker to react to this new 
context by heavily speculating in commodity markets to protect against inflation. If they learn 
that Chinese sovereign funds also intend to massively enter these markets, they will bring
commodity prices to levels such that it will be significantly risky in the short and medium
term for newcomers in these markets.
Third, investment in well-managed Western firms could be blocked for political and/or 
regulatory reasons. The proposition by Q. Chen (2009) urging the PBC to invest its reserves in 11
major US banks is probably unrealizable as shown by the unsuccessful takeover of Conoco 
Phillips by China National Offshore Oil, that the U.S. Congress stymied on the pretext of
national security. Assets in countries richly endowed with raw materials but underdeveloped 
are exposed to political struggles between countries with vested interests and newcomers. It is 
unlikely that China could invest there a significant portion of its reserves even if it consents to 
be  accused  of  practicing  so-called  neo-colonialism. China  must  therefore  not  be 
overambitious  in  foreign  investments and  should  focus  more  on  its domestic  market in
following the example of international investors.
Due to progress in the labour productivity and the scope and quality of goods exported, 
the problem of undervaluation will worsen in the future if necessary adjustments are not 
quickly conducted. To avoid an ever massive loss on its growing foreign exchange reserves, 
China must now revalue its currency appropriately. Indeed, the longer China waits, the more
the adjustment will be painful and difficult to conduct: major financial and economic crises 
for Chinese and World economies could result, with the final outcome in terms of economic, 
social and political stability uncontrollable for policymakers. The inevitable revaluation, if 
quickly carried out, improves the social welfare not only in the long term but also in the short 
term. To accomplish it, Chinese policymakers should think in terms of real revaluation of the 
Yuan. This avoids a focus on nominal revaluation, demanded by Western politicians and
international speculators, while permitting a different political and economic outlook.
Chinese policymakers, who doubt a lot, must break completely with the illusion that it is 
good to increase the large digital number registered in the central computer of the Fed (or 
other central banks and financial institutions) which does not even have to run the printing 
press. A better alternative would be to buy goods in China and sell them to insolvent Chinese 
households granted perpetual USD-denominated bank loans destined to buy them.12
The accumulation of international reserves imposes significant welfare costs on ordinary 
workers,  because  they  are  paid  wages lower  than  they  deserve.  Moreover,  competitive 
advantages gained with the Yuan’s undervaluation do not necessarily allow China to acquire 
strategic positions in high-tech industries and services because low wages encourage firms to 
utilize low-skilled employees instead of investing in R&D. Growth gained through lower 
costs could latter be swept by the inevitable revaluation of the Yuan. Conversely, a moderate 
but continual increase in labour costs pushes firms to introduce new products, new production 
processes and new distribution techniques, thereby inducing endogenous growth.
Politically, China cannot refuse the Yuan’s revaluation because China seems, with large 
trade surpluses, to be the country that benefits most from monetary and fiscal stimulus of
industrialised countries. Many of them are unhappy with the fact that they benefit little of 
Chinese strong growth because China mainly needs raw materials, intermediate inputs and 
machineries. Despite that the Yuan’s undervaluation is partly due to loose monetary and fiscal 
policies  in  developed  countries,  China cannot  avoid  the adjustment  obligation  although 
traditionally the needed adjustment is imposed on deficit countries. Time has changed since 
they are no longer emerging economies but called the USA or members of the EU.
According to (1), to ensure  0 # $ t X , Chinese policymakers can adjust the real exchange 
rate,   t P
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h
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to variables) to reduce trade and capital imbalances and hence the necessary adjustment of  t S .
Considering that China should adopt a flexible exchange rate regime in the medium term, I 
examine hereafter the strategies to realize the Yuan’s real revaluation before the regime shift.
4. The combination of strategies for a real revaluation13
While real appreciation via nominal appreciation is common among some low inflation 
OECD  economies  such  as  Germany  and  Japan,  a  far  more  frequent  occurrence  among 
economies that started at a very low per-capita income level is real appreciation via faster 
wage growth and inflation (Xu 2009). Therefore, China has three options to eliminate the 
Yuan’s  undervaluation:  1)  fast nominal  revaluation;  2)  “uncompetitive  inflation”;  3)  the
intermediate option.
Fast Yuan revaluation could be better than price policies because the latter require a long 
period to achieve trade balance and induce fluctuations of output and inflation (Huang 2010). 
However, recent evolutions show that Chinese wages and prices are quite flexible on the 
upside, limiting hence adjustment costs under price policies. While the domestic economy 
could pick up most of the external slack due to a large exchange-rate revaluation, the prospect 
of sharp decelerations in export growth will remain a concern for policymakers and warrants 
careful attention especially in developing countries (Kappler et al. 2011). In effect, such a 
policy provides huge capital gains to market operators holding Yuan-denominated assets but 
induces high adjustment costs for businesses not prepared for it. Hundreds of thousands of 
businesses could fail and dismiss tens of millions of workers, creating a social and political 
unrest in China. Furthermore, it could have serious undesired long-term effects on the Chinese 
economy if we refer to Japanese experiences. Following the Plaza accord imposing a fast Yen 
appreciation, Japan has experienced a short-term recession followed by a speculative boom 
and  finally  a  lost  decade  (Hamada and Okada 2009). Symmetrically,  a  fast  nominal 
revaluation of the Yuan could induce a large devaluation of the USD with the risk of seriously 
undermining macroeconomic stability of the world economy (McKinnon and Schnabl 2006).
No evidence shows that “uncompetitive inflation” has been deliberately conceived as a 
policy option. Its inverse, i.e. “competitive disinflation”, was experienced with some success 
by  France  under  fixed  nominal  exchange  rate  (Blanchard  and  Muet  1993;  Fitoussi  et  al.14
1993).  Germany  replicated  this  strategy  to  gain  competitiveness  after  having  joined  the 
eurozone  (Creel  and  Le  Cacheux  2006).  The  success  of  such  a  strategy  is  based  on  the 
capacity of an economy to make internal adjustments in terms of wages, prices and production 
combined with restrictive monetary and fiscal policies to make the strategy credible. One 
limit  to  the  competitive  disinflation  is  therefore  that  it  could  lead  to  temporary  higher 
unemployment if it takes time to be entirely credible or when nominal wages are rigid.
Using a theoretical model, we propose that, given that China is not constrained to carry 
out either the first or the second option, it is optimal to combine them to eliminate the Yuan’s 
undervaluation. 
The model has four equations similar to these used by Blanchard and Muet (1993) and 
Fitoussi et al. (1993). For simplicity, we adopt the assumption of perfect foresight. We add to 
their  model  the LM  equation  and  an  equation  describing  the  balance  of  payments  while 
modifying the IS equation as follows:
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where all variables except t i and  t . are in log. The lower case variables correspond to the 
logarithm of the upper case variables defined previously.  t p is the domestic price level or 
consumer  price,
n y the  potential  output,  1 " " % t t t p p . the  inflation  rate,  t m the  money 
supply,  t h the domestic component of money supply (or domestic credit). t l t d t p t w , , , , , , , ( ( ( (15
and  t f , ( represent exogenous shocks (including policy shocks) affecting the labour market, 
the  production,  the  goods  demand,  the  money  market  and  the  foreign  exchange  market 
respectively. Equation (2) describes how the nominal wage adjusts with the price level and the 
output gap. Equation (3) shows that the consumer price is the weighted average of the prices 
of domestic and foreign goods. Equation (4) gives the price of domestic goods as a weighted 
average of the wage and the price of foreign goods. Equations (5) and (6) are the equilibrium 
condition in goods and money markets respectively. Equation (7) is a linear form of (1) with 
some variables neglected for simplicity.
The Chinese government stabilizes inflation and output around their respective targets. To 
realize the Yuan’s real revaluation, it must fix an inflation target 
T
t . higher than the foreign 
inflation but lower than what is tolerable for the population. This avoids the accumulation of 
inflationary  pressures,  induced  by  American  and European  quantitative  easing  policies  to 
result  in  a  stronger  pressure  for  revaluing  the  Yuan.  Moreover,  it  might  also  desire to 
smoothly reduce its foreign exchange reserves by fixing a transitory objective for the latter in 
each period. The government minimizes the loss function:
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The policy rules (12)-(13) imply the simultaneous utilization of the monetary policy (a 
kind of “uncompetitive inflation”) and the exchange rate policy by the government desiring to 
eliminate the Yuan’s undervaluation while stabilizing the economy and reducing gradually 
foreign exchange reserves. The two policies are interdependent: the domestic credit depends 
on the nominal exchange rate while the optimal devaluation rate ( t t e e " !1 ) depends on how the 
monetary  policy  ( t h ) is  conducted.  The  rule  (13) does  not  imply  a  one-step  nominal 
revaluation of the Yuan since its deviation from the equilibrium takes many periods to be 
totally absorbed. These rules imply that structural and macroeconomic policies could also 




( ; and structural parameters. The 
use  of  complementary  policies could  reduce  overall adjustment  costs  in  the  presence  of 17
multiplicative model uncertainty (Brainard 1967) because each policy instrument is used with 
less intensity and is less likely to induce systemic risk for the economy.
5. Polices supporting the strategy of real revaluation
The Chinese government is concerned with that the Yuan’s revaluation could induce high
unemployment due to a weak growth, and severe financial and monetary crisis. This implies a
gradual nominal revaluation of the Yuan, with the risk of continuously worsening external 
imbalances.
Taking  account  of  China’s  trade  structure,  financial  fragility  and  macroeconomic 
imbalance, some researchers advocate alternative structural and macroeconomic measures to 
effectively deal with the Yuan’s valuation issue (Liu 2004; Dai 2006; Woo 2006; Eichengreen
and  Hatase 2007; Hong  et  al. 2008;  N’Diaye  2010).  They include  reducing  distortionary 
export subsidies and gradually removing excessive fiscal incentives granted to FDI-founded 
firms,  expansionary  fiscal  policy  with  a  focus  on  infrastructure  investment,  a  package  of 
policies  to  stimulate  domestic  consumption  (including  higher  expenditures  on  education, 
health care, social safety nets and poverty reduction, income policies to reduce inequality and 
to  increase  wage  income),  the  establishment  of  an  efficient  financial  intermediation 
mechanism with good regulations and supervision, and reforms destined to level the playing 
field between the tradable and the non-tradable sector and to further open up the economy to 
foreign competition.
By  implementing  such  policies,  in  complement  to  the  strategy  of  real  devaluation 
considered above, China could more quickly narrow external and internal imbalances and 
lower the excessively high savings rate, hence contributing to an orderly global rebalancing.18
The Chinese government should give full consideration to these policies and apply them with 
diligence in the new international context.
The objectives set recently by the Chinese government show that it will abandon the 
export-led development strategy and adopt a growth strategy based on domestic demand. In
this  perspective,  the  above-mentioned  measures and  others, if  properly  and  promptly 
implemented, could make effective the Yuan’s real revaluation and hence reduce internal and 
external  imbalances. Henceforth,  I  will  discuss  selectively  some  of  these  measures  and 
advocate some new ones, such as abandoning one-child policy, policies to increase the growth 
potential or negotiating a less loose monetary policy in Western countries.
One consensus is to promote higher wages for workers who have sacrificed during several
decades  for  China’s  development  and  de  facto mainly  in  favour of  foreign  capital  and 
consumers. Such a policy does not necessarily harm growth because foreign firms will still 
locate in China for production destined to export if the wage growth does not exceed that of 
productivity. Besides, higher purchasing power will encourage foreign firms to produce in 
China  to  satisfy  a stronger  local demand.  Rising  wages  will  likely  eliminate  some  firms
creating little added-value but will encourage others to innovate and to migrate to product 
segments with higher added value. This process will not easily jumpstart if wages remain very 
low and it is likely to break down in the event of abrupt and large revaluation of the Yuan
because too many firms fail simultaneously.
Some measures could be put in place to reassure Chinese consumers, to encourage them to 
spend more or to stimulate their consumption needs. Without going as far as to build a system 
of  social  security  which  generates  chronic  deficits  as  in  many  Western  countries,  an 
appropriate social security for a larger part of the population allows to reduce precautionary 
savings.  Previous  reforms of education  have significantly  increased  educational costs  for 
Chinese  households.  More  financial  support  for  low-income  households with  children  in 19
school and university allows them to forego less to finance the study while inciting the young
to follow a fairly extensive training, favourable to the long-term growth.
An important measure is to end the one-child policy for urban dwellers. This policy has 
helped accelerate China’s growth since 1980s by generating more savings but makes little 
sense  today  as  China  exports  capital.  It  creates  problems linked  to an  aging  population 
(retirement funding, healthcare etc.), not to mention the difficulties faced by every young 
couple to take care of four aging parents. These concerns lead households to save more by 
reducing current consumption. Its reform can increase immediate consumption by diminishing 
these concerns and by inducing expenditures for raising more children. Given that cities are 
better  endowed  with  educational  facilities,  children  born  there have  better  educational 
conditions  than  these  in  the  countryside,  abandoning  the  policy  will  allow  effectively 
renewing  the  urban  population  of  qualified  professionals  (and  avoiding  their  shortage)  to 
sustain long-term growth.
Public expenditures destined to improve supply conditions in the long term should be 
implemented and they could be partly financed by the purchase of government bonds by the 
PBC. The government can modulate their levels to avoid a slump in growth during the real 
revaluation  process.  Additional  funds  should  be  mobilised:  1)  to  improve  superior and 
professional education, to develop basic research and to stimulate R&S in Chinese firms. 
They help build the foundation of a knowledge economy and enable China to narrow the 
technology  gap  with  industrialised  countries;  2)  to  improve  the  infrastructure.  Numerous 
projects  (airports,  bridges,  high-speed  railways,  highways,  ports,  subways,  etc.)  are  to be 
realised, notably in underdeveloped areas, and medium and small cities;  3) to modernize 
agriculture to cope with the very strong inflationary pressure actually observed in food prices 
and with the likely shortage of agricultural products in the decades to come, by providing 20
more funds to farmers, developing farmer-training centres and financing more public and
private food research.
The  government  should  pay  attention  to  macroeconomic  and  social  risks that  could 
compromise the real revaluation strategy partly based on higher inflation: 1) it should stabilise 
food prices to avoid that they amplify too much the inflation, making the life of low-income 
households too difficult; 2) it should cool speculative property development to avoid the risk 
experienced  by  Spain facing  now  an  unprecedented  economic  and  financial  crisis. The 
consequences could be dramatic if important bubbles form in China and then burst (Ueda 
2010).
To  significantly  reduce  external  imbalances,  China  could  also  reduce tax  rebates  for 
exports, cut tariffs and restrictions on imports, decrease the benefits given to foreign firms
(while treating them equally with national ones), heavily tax capital gains realised by foreign 
corporations and financial institutions, while restricting short-term capital movements. The 
government should reduce the incentive for local officials to attract foreign investors by not 
linking  political promotion  to  the  amount  of  FDI.  Enhanced  environmental  requirements 
could be implemented to reduce the transfer of polluting production lines in China.
These measures and others not discussed here, by increasing domestic demand, wages and 
inflation, and by reducing net exports and net inflows of capital, should gradually induce the 
real appreciation of the Yuan and the reduction of external imbalances while mitigating its
negative effects on China’s growth.
To  absorb  abundant  domestic  savings,  the  government  should  strive  to  create  more 
domestic savings vehicles by increasing good-quality financial assets through, e.g., selling 
more shares of  public  enterprises  at  fair prices,  debt emissions by  firms and  creation of 
venture  capital  funds. After  the  adoption  of  flexible  exchange  rate regime,  the  authority 
should relax its control on the foreign exchange settlement system, allow the private sector to 21
hold foreign currencies, and encourage foreign assets to be denominated in RMB (Zheng and 
Yi 2007; Zhu 2010).
Once  the  real  revaluation strategy  is  adopted,  China  could  negotiate  for  less  loose
monetary and fiscal policies in the USA because such policies are ineffective due to debt 
ceiling and the ZLB, and complicate the conduct of policies in China. China should counter 
the accusation of exchange rate manipulation by criticising the USA for manipulating its
currency  to  maximize  seigniorage revenues. Indeed,  the  USA enjoys unprecedented
seigniorage  revenues thanks  to  the  accumulation  of  dollars  by  Asian  central  banks  and 
countries exporting raw materials. The behaviour of the latter could radically change if the 
creation of USD accelerates again, destroying the optimism of Cooper (2009) about the long-
lasting role of the USD as dominant international currency. An argument that could convince 
American policymakers is that excessively exploring this source of income, permitted by the 
status of  international  currency  gained by the USD after  the  Second  World  War,  will 
eventually lead to its disappearance or dry-up.
6. Conclusions
The Yuan’s revaluation fuels the debate in China and abroad when some countries are 
likely to initiate a “war of currencies” by devaluing its currency to boost national growth to 
the detriment of other countries. 
This paper has argued that the Fed’s loose monetary policy is, among many factors, an 
important determinant of the Yuan’s undervaluation, and China cannot efficiently invest its 
increasingly  large  foreign  exchange  reserves.  The  accumulation  of  the  latter,  originally 
intended to ensure the stability of nominal exchange rate, is not anymore beneficial because it 
becomes very excessive and induces an important loss of Chinese social welfare. The refusal 22
to  revalue  the  Yuan implies more  damaging  future  adjustments  for  Chinese  and  World 
economies, while a well managed revaluation of the Yuan will increase the social welfare 
without significant harms to China’s growth in the short or long run. Conversely, fast nominal 
revaluation  of  the  Yuan  against  other  currencies  (USD,  euro  and  yen)  must  be  rejected 
because of its important negative effects on China’s short-run growth.
To tackle the problem, this paper has proposed, using a theoretical framework, an optimal
strategy combining gradual nominal devaluation and higher inflation with other structural and 
macroeconomic  policies  to  achieve  the  Yuan’s  real  revaluation  and  to  eliminate  external 
imbalances  represented by  increasingly  large foreign  exchange  reserves. Policy  measures,
e.g., higher wages, changes in fiscal and regulatory rules to reduce net exports and net inflows
of capital, more public expenditures on infrastructure, additional funds for national education
and R&D, reforms of the social security system, abandonment of the one-child policy, and 
negotiating a less loose US monetary policy, could help minimize the adjustment costs related 
to the Yuan’s real revaluation while stimulating future growth.
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